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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In den letzten Jahren hat die aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik (AAMP) einen größeren
Akzent auf Unterstützung bei der Arbeitssuche, Kontrolle und Überprüfung der
Arbeitsverfügbarkeit sowie auf begrenzte Qualifizierung für eine kurzfristige Ak-
tivierung der Arbeitslosen gesetzt. In Deutschland spiegelt sich die Fokussierung auf
Aktivierungsstrategien in der Abkehr von traditionellen längeren Weiterbildungs-
maßnahmen wider, die typischerweise einige Monate bis zwei Jahre dauern, hin zu
kurzen Trainingsmaßnahmen mit einer Dauer von zwei bis zwölf Wochen. Heutige
Kurzzeitmaßnahmen in Deutschland verfolgen zwei Hauptziele. Zum einen sollen
sie die Wiedereingliederung der Teilnehmer in Beschäftigung durch Beratung und
Qualifizierung (wie z.B. Bewerbungstraining, Beratung über Möglichkeiten der Ar-
beitsplatzsuche oder Vermittlung von elementaren Computerkenntnissen) erhöhen.
Das zweite Ziel der Kurzzeitmaßnahmen ist die Feststellung der Aussichten des Ar-
beitssuchenden am Arbeitsmarkt sowie seiner Eignung für verschiedene berufliche
Tätigkeiten, aber auch seiner Arbeitsverfügbarkeit und -bereitschaft.
Bereits in den 1980ern und Anfang der 1990er Jahre gab es in Deutschland Kurzzeit-
maßnahmen nach §41a AFG, die den modernen Trainingsmaßnahmen sehr ähnlich
waren. Während Aktivierung und Kontrolle ein wichtiges Ziel der aktuellen Train-
ingsmaßnahmen darstellen, konzentrierten sich die früheren Kurzzeitmaßnahmen
lediglich auf Unterstützung bei der Arbeitssuche, begrenzte Kenntnisvermittlung
und Beratung hinsichtlich zukünftiger Teilnahme an den längeren Weiterbildungs-
maßnahmen.
Diese Arbeit schätzt Effekte von Kurzzeitmaßnahmen in Westdeutschland, die in
den Zeitspannen 1980 bis 1992 und 2000 bis 2003 begonnen wurden, im Hinblick
auf zwei Größen: Beschäftigung und Teilnahme an längeren Maßnahmen. Als er-
ste Studie betrachtet die vorliegende Arbeit unter Verwendung von administrativen
Daten gleichzeitig einen Zeitraum von achtzehn Jahren in den 1980ern und 1990ern
und vier Jahren in den 2000er Jahren, um mittel- und langfristige Beschäftigungsef-
fekte von Kurzzeitmaßnahmen zu untersuchen. Weiterhin ist dies die erste Ar-
beit, die die Kurzzeitmaßnahmen in den 1980ern und Anfang der 1990er Jahre mit
modernen Evaluationsmethoden analysiert. Wir untersuchen die Wirksamkeit der
verschiedenen Typen von Kurzzeitmaßnahmen. Da bei den früheren Kurzzeitmaß-
nahmen keine Überprüfung und Kontrolle der Arbeitslosen vorgesehen war, unter-
scheiden wir zwei Typen von Trainingsmaßnahmen in den 2000er Jahren: eine Train-
ingsvariante mit dem Schwerpunkt Kenntnisvermittlung und eine Kontrollvariante
mit Schwerpunkt Überprüfung und Kontrolle der Suchanstrengungen. Nach unserer
Einschätzung weisen die Kurzzeitmaßnahmen in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren eine
größere Ähnlichkeit mit der Trainingsvariante der aktuellen Trainingsmaßnahmen
auf.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Kurzzeitmaßnahmen meistens längerfristige pos-
itive (oft signifikante) Beschäftigungseffekte aufweisen. Die Effekte sind beson-
ders stark, wenn die Teilnahme zwischen dem siebten und zwölften Monat der
Arbeitslosigkeitsperiode beginnt. Kleinere Effekte ergeben sich für die Kurzzeit-
maßnahmen, die während des zweiten Jahres der Arbeitslosigkeitsperiode beginnen.
Kurzzeitmaßnahmen mit einem Fokus auf Prüfung und Kontrolle der Suchanstren-
gungen zeigen etwas kleinere Effekte im Vergleich zur reinen Trainingsvariante. Die
Lock-in-Periode war in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren länger im Vergleich zu den
frühen 2000er Jahren. Kurzzeitmaßnahmen führen zu einer höheren Teilnahme an
längeren Maßnahmen, wobei dieser Effekt in der früheren Zeitperiode viel stärker
ausgeprägt war. Die Beschäftigungseffekte von früheren Kurzzeitmaßnahmen weisen
keine signifikanten Unterschiede in der Periode zwischen 1980 und 1992 auf, d.h. es
gibt keinen Beleg für Konjunktureffekte.
Die Tatsache, dass in einigen Fällen langfristige Effekte von Kurzzeitmaßnahmen
geschätzt werden, überrascht vielleicht angesichts der kurzen Dauer der Maßnahmen.
Diese Maßnahmen stellen keine beträchtliche Humankapitalinvestition dar. Zukün-
ftige Untersuchungen sollten die Hypothese überprüfen, ob positive langfristige Maß-
nahmeeffekte auf eine höhere Teilnahmequote an längeren Maßnahmen zurückge-
führt werden können.
Nontechnical Summary
Over the past few years, active labor market policies (ALMP) have placed a greater
emphasis on job search assistance, monitoring and testing work availability, as well as
limited training to activate the unemployed in the short run. In Germany, the focus
on activation strategies is reflected in the recent shift away from traditional longer
further training programs, typically lasting a couple of months up to two years, to
short–term training programs lasting between two and twelve weeks. Current short–
term training programs in Germany have two main goals. First, they are supposed
to enhance reintegration of the participants into employment through guidance and
qualification (like job-application training, general counseling on job search methods
or limited computer skills). The second aim of short–term training is to assess the
job seekers’ labor market opportunities and their suitability for different jobs but
also their availability and willingness to work.
Already in the 1980s and in the early 1990s, short–term training programs similar in
nature to short–term training in the 2000s was in place in Germany. While activation
and monitoring is a major goal of modern short–term training, the older short–term
training focus solely on job search assistance, limited training, and guidance towards
future participation in longer training programs.
This paper estimates the effects of short–term training programs in West Germany
starting in the time period 1980 to 1992 and 2000 to 2003 regarding the two outcomes
employment and participation in longer–term training programs. In particular, we
contribute to the literature regarding the following three points: 1) Our paper is the
first using administrative data covering such a long time period, namely 18 years
in the 1980s and 1990s and four years in the early 2000s to study the medium–
and long–term employment effects of short–term training. 2) This paper is the first
to use state–of–the–art estimators of treatment effects for the short–term training
programs in the 1980s and early 1990s. 3) We analyze the effectiveness of different
types of short–term training. Because the older short–term training programs were
not intended to test and monitor the unemployed, we distinguish two versions of
short–term training in the 2000s, namely the training variant which focuses on skill
provision and the checking variant which focuses on testing and monitoring search
effort. We argue that the short–term training in the 1980s and 1990s are more
similar to the training variant of modern short–term training.
Our results show that short–term training shows mostly persistently positive and
often significant employment effects. The effects are particularly strong when par-
ticipation starts during months 7 to 12 of the unemployment spell. We tend to find
smaller effects for short–term training starting during the second year of the unem-
ployment spell. Short–term training focusing on testing and monitoring search effort
shows slightly smaller effects compared to the pure training variant. The lock–in
periods lasted longer in the 1980s and 1990s compared to the early 2000s. Short–
term training results in higher future participation in longer training programs and
this effect was much stronger for the earlier time period. The employment effects of
the older short–term training programs did not change significantly by year between
1980 and 1992, i.e. there is no evidence for business cycle effects.
The fact that we find some long lasting effects of short–term training may be sur-
prising given their short duration. These programs by themselves do not provide a
sizeable human capital investment. Future research should investigate the hypothe-
sis that the positive program effects can be traced back to the higher participation
rates in longer training programs.
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1 Introduction
“... there is almost never a stable set of active programmes to evaluate. Coun-
tries are continuously chopping and changing the mix of programmes.”
Martin and Grubb (2001, p. 21)
Over the past few years, active labor market policies (ALMP) have placed a greater
emphasis on job search assistance, monitoring and testing work availability, as well
as limited training to activate the unemployed in the short run (OECD, 2007). There
has been a greater focus to activate the unemployed to find unsubsidized jobs instead
of placing unemployed in longer traditional training programs or public employment
schemes. Short–term programs are replacing longer programs in order to prevent
long lock–in effects.
Public sector sponsored training has traditionally been a main part of ALMP in
many countries including Germany, see the surveys in Fay (1996), Martin and Grubb
(2001), and Kluve (2006). Although there were many pessimistic assessments re-
garding the usefulness of such programs, these surveys point out that small scale
training programs, which are well targeted to specific groups and which involve a
strong on–the–job component, can show positive employment effects. Little is known
in the literature on the medium– and long–run effects of activation strategies which
combine training, job search assistance, and monitoring.
In Germany, the focus on activation strategies is reflected in the recent shift away
from traditional longer further training programs, typically lasting a couple of
months up to two years, to short–term training programs (Trainingsmaßnahmen,
henceforth denoted by ‘ST00’≡short–term training in the 2000s) lasting at most
twelve weeks. In fact, ST00 have become the largest program in Germany regarding
the number of participants with 1.07 Million individuals entering such a program in
2007 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007, pp. 54, 57). In contrast, only 356 thousand
individuals entered longer further training programs in 2007.2 Longer further train-
ing programs used to be the largest programs in Germany but have been replaced to
a large extent by ST00. In light of the recent evidence that long training programs
mostly show positive long–run employment effects (Fitzenberger et al., 2008; Lech-
ner et al., 2004), one might be concerned that a focus on activation strategies comes
at the expense of pushing the unemployed into instable jobs which do not result
in permanently better employment prospects. There are different types of ST00
2In 2000, there was a reverse ranking with 552 thousand individuals entering longer further
training programs and 477 thousand individuals entering ST00 (see table 2 in the appendix).
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programs. In this paper, we distinguish programs which focus on skill provision and
programs which focus on testing and monitoring search effort.
Between 1980 and 1992, short–term training programs similar in nature to ST00
were in place in West Germany (and since 1990 also in East Germany). These were
the ‘programs according to §41a Employment Promotion Act’ (Maßnahmen nach
§41a Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, henceforth denoted by ‘ST8092’≡short–term training
between 1980 and 1992). Due to budgetary reasons these programs were abolished in
1992. In 1998, short–term training in form of ST00 was reintroduced into the Social
Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III ) that nowadays regulates labor market policy. While
activation and monitoring is a major goal of ST00, the older ST8092 focus solely on
job search assistance, limited training, and guidance towards future participation in
longer training programs. Furthermore, the ST8092 programs were targeted to low–
skilled and hard–to–place unemployed. The common features of the two programs
are provision of short–term training, assessment of the unemployed (e.g. regarding
future assignment to longer labor market programs), and job search assistance.
There have been a number of studies which evaluate effects of short–term training
since 2000 (ST00) using different program evaluation estimators (Hujer et al., 2006;
Lechner and Wunsch, 2007; Biewen et al., 2007; Stephan et al., 2006; Büttner, 2007;
Osikominu, 2008). We are not aware of any study which uses modern approaches
to estimate treatment effects for the older ST8092 programs. In the following, we
summarize the evidence for ST00 and other short further training programs in West
Germany. Lechner et al. (2004) analyze shorter further training programs in the
1990s that last longer than ST00 or ST8092 programs and provide more sizeable
investments into professional skills. This study finds that the cumulated long–run
employment effects of shorter training are higher than for longer training programs.
Lechner and Wunsch (2006) show that the effect of longer training programs differs
over the business cycle such that these programs show better employment effects
when unemployment is high. This suggests that the activation effect of these pro-
grams on the unemployed is higher when unemployment is high. To our knowledge,
no comparable evidence exists for short–term training, which has a stronger focus
on activation compared to longer training programs.
Hujer et al. (2006) and Osikominu (2008) apply duration methods to evaluate ST00.
They find evidence that ST00 reduce the duration of unemployment by increas-
ing the hazard rate for exits from unemployment to employment in the short run.
Osikominu (2008) finds no long–run effects on the hazard rate from employment
back to unemployment. According to Hujer et al. (2006) men tend to benefit more
strongly than women. Osikominu (2008), in contrast, does not find significant gen-
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der differences. Using different versions of matching estimators, Biewen et al. (2007)
and Lechner and Wunsch (2007) show that for the time period of the early 2000s
ST00 tends to perform better than longer further training programs regarding their
employment effects. Biewen et al. (2007) find some significantly positive employ-
ment effects for ST00 in West Germany, whereas Lechner and Wunsch (2007) find
no significantly positive treatment effects.
The studies reviewed so far do not distinguish different types of ST00. Stephan
et al. (2006) consider participation in different versions of ST00 in the second half
of the year 2002. The study uses a matching estimator and finds differing results
depending on the type of ST00. The monitoring and testing version of ST00 does
not show positive results, whereas the training versions show significantly positive or
negative results depending upon whether the training takes place in a firm. Büttner
(2007) uses a small experimental data set for 2005 in one region of West Germany
and investigates the effect of sending an invitation to participate in a ST00 pro-
gram which involves monitoring and testing. Out of 189 unemployed receiving an
invitation 77 actually participate. The focus is on distinguishing the effects of an-
nouncement (‘threat’) of treatment from the effect of actual treatment. The study
finds differences between the announcement effect and the treatment effect. In fact,
the announcement results in earlier exits from unemployment, whereas the actual
treatment shows no such effects. The exits from unemployment, however, do not
translate into significantly higher exits to employment.
The literature review reveals that most studies did not distinguish different types of
ST00 programs and that estimates of the long–run effects of short–term training are
missing. This paper estimates the effects of short–term training programs in West
Germany both for the time period 1980 to 1992 (ST8092) and 2000 to 2003 (ST00)
regarding both employment and participation in longer–term training programs.
This paper is the first to use state–of–the–art estimators of treatment effects for
the short–term training programs in the 1980s and early 1990s. We investigate
in particular whether there are lasting positive effects on employment outcomes
and whether participation in these programs lead to higher participation in longer
training programs afterwards. Furthermore, we analyze whether treatment effects
differ over calendar time. We provide similar estimates for participation in short–
term training in the early 2000s. Because the ST8092 programs were not intended to
test and monitor the unemployed, we distinguish two versions of ST00, namely the
training variant which focuses on skill provision (QST00) and the checking variant
which focuses on testing and monitoring search effort (MST00). We argue that the
ST8092 programs are to be compared to the QST00 version of ST00.
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Methodologically, this paper follows Sianesi (2004) and estimates the effects of treat-
ment starting after some given unemployment experience against the alternative of
not starting treatment at this point of time and waiting longer. To be able to
compare the results for the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, we use the same method-
ological approach in all cases. Most evaluation studies in the past used a static
approach evaluating the effects of receiving treatment during a certain period of
time against the alternative of not receiving treatment during this period of time.3
In a dynamic setting, the timing of events becomes important, see Abbring and van
den Berg (2003), Fredriksson and Johansson (2003), and Sianesi (2003, 2004). Static
treatment evaluations implicitly condition on future outcomes leading to possibly
biased treatment effects. The nontreated individuals in the data might be observed
as nontreated because their treatment starts after the end of the observation pe-
riod or because they exit unemployment before treatment starts (Fredriksson and
Johansson, 2003).
Appropriate data for a long–term evaluation of public sector sponsored training pro-
grams were not available for a long time. This is the first paper using administrative
data covering such a long time period, namely 18 years in the 1980s and 1990s and
four years in the early 2000s to study the medium–term and, for the earlier time
period, also the long–term employment effects of short–term training. The com-
parison between the earlier and the more recent time period is interesting because
of the similarities between the two programs. In addition to employment, we also
consider the effects on future participation in longer further training programs. This
is important because one stated goal of short–term training in Germany is to assess
the unemployed’s need to participate in longer–term training programs. However,
with an increasing focus on short-run activation strategies this goal may have lost
in importance over time.
According to our results, short–term training shows mostly persistently positive
and often significant employment effects. The effects are particularly strong when
participation starts during months seven to twelve of the unemployment spell. The
effects for short–term training starting during the second year of the unemployment
spell tend to be smaller. The monitoring variant MST00 shows slightly smaller
effects compared to the pure training variant QST00. The lock–in periods last longer
for ST8092 compared to ST00 and the employment effects tend to be smaller for the
earlier time period compared to QST00 but not compared to MST00. Short–term
training results in higher future participation in longer further training programs
and this effect is much stronger for the earlier time period.
3Hujer et al. (2006), Biewen et al. (2007), and Osikominu (2008) are exceptions.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the insti-
tutional aspects of short–term training in Germany. Section 3 focuses on the data
used. Section 4 describes the methodological approach to estimate the treatment
effects. The empirical results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes. The
appendix provides detailed empirical results.
2 Institutional Background
In Germany, training is traditionally a very important part of active labor market
policy that aims at permanently reintegrating unemployed individuals into the labor
market.4 Among the different types of training programs offered, medium– and long–
term further training programs with a duration of up to two years used to play the
most important role since their introduction in 1969. During the 1980s and since
1999, short–term training programs have been used at a large scale, too. Table 1
displays the entries into different types of active labor market programs in West
Germany in the period 1979 to 1992. It can be seen that entries into short–term
training rose steadily until 1987, remained at a lower level in 1988 and 1989 and
peaked again in 1990. Table 2 shows the participation numbers in Germany as
well as West Germany for the more recent period since 1999. During the recent
years participation in short–term training rose considerably. Since 2001, short–term
training has become the most important type of training regarding the number of
participants.
Modern short–term training programs (ST00) have two main goals. First, they
are supposed to enhance reintegration of the participants into employment through
guidance and qualification. This may comprise training job search skills through
activities such as job-application training, simulation of job interviews or general
counseling on job search methods. It may also involve the provision of specific
skills (like limited computer skills or some technical tasks) that are necessary to
improve the job seeker’s labor market prospects.5 The second aim of short–term
training is to assess the job seekers’ labor market opportunities and their suitability
for different jobs but also their availability and willingness to work. This may
entail the preparation of detailed work plans to reintegrate the job seeker into the
labor market, which can include participation in a longer training program.6 The
4Other important policy instruments are for instance employment subsidies, job creation in the
public sector and measures to promote self-employment.
5For more details on the contents of short–term training see Kurtz (2003).
6One element of the law called Job-AQTIV Gesetz introduced in 2002 is to assess the job seeker
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availability of the unemployed is checked by pledging him or her to attend the
fulltime training program. In our empirical analysis we therefore distinguish short–
term training programs for which the objective of qualifying the job seeker dominates
from programs that put more emphasis on testing the availability to work and
assessing the job seekers’ opportunities using the information on the program codes
in the data. Such a distinction can only be an approximation, as the same program
can serve both purposes, even for the same participant. However, this distinction is
also useful for the comparison with short–term training in the period 1980 to 1992,
where testing work availability was no (official) goal.
ST00 programs last between two and twelve weeks (with median duration around
four weeks). Therefore, they are relatively cheap compared to the longer further
training programs. In fact, a one–month short–term training course costs on average
e590 per participant, whereas participation costs for a further training course lasting
nine months amount to about e5850, see Biewen et al. (2007, table 1).
In the 1980s and 1990s, there existed short–term training programs (ST8092) that
were very similar to those described above. The law governing active labor market
policy at that time, the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz), in-
cluded a paragraph on “measures to improve the employment chances for the unem-
ployed” (Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Vermittlungsaussichten für Arbeitslose).
The number of this paragraph gave the programs their name: ‘measures according
to §41a’. These programs where introduced in 1979 after the German labor market
conditions had worsened in the 1970s and the number of long–term unemployed had
risen considerably.
ST8092 programs were particularly targeted at individuals with lower reemploy-
ment chances as women, individuals without formal qualification and long–term
unemployed. Hard–to–place and low–skilled individuals were under–represented in
the existing medium– and long–term training programs. Short–term training was
intended to counsel job seekers about their employment chances and the possibilities
of participating in medium– or long–term training programs on the one hand and to
teach limited skills helpful for either employment or participation in a longer train-
ing program on the other hand (Dobischat and Wassmann, 1981). Similar to ST00,
ST8092 programs mostly consisted of full–time classroom training. The curriculum
covered e.g. job counseling, information on public sponsored further training pro-
grams and on the general labor market situation, application and communication
training, visiting firms and exercises with the intention to stabilize the personality
soon after becoming unemployed. This may be done through a short–term training program
(Kurtz, 2003).
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of the participants. The maximal length was in general six weeks and there was no
exam at the end of the course (Schneider, 1981).
At the end of 1992, ST8092 programs were abolished in order to reduce the costs of
active labor market policy in a time of narrow budget. More intensive and completely
sponsored short–term training programs only reappeared in 1997 (in the first years
with a small number of participants only) and became important again from 1999
onwards (Kurtz, 2003).
When becoming unemployed individuals have to personally register at the local la-
bor office. This involves a first counseling interview with the caseworker. Further
interviews may follow from time to time. Based on these interviews in general the
case workers decides whether to assign an unemployed to a program. Besides being
registered as unemployed or as a job seeker at risk of becoming unemployed, candi-
dates for short–term training do not have to fulfil any additional eligibility criteria.
Depending on regional and local circumstances, caseworkers exercise a considerable
amount of discretion when allocating unemployed to the different programs. Suit-
able programs are chosen from a pool of certified public or private providers.
The employment office pays all direct training costs for short–term training pro-
grams. In addition, ST00 participants continue to receive unemployment benefits
or means-tested unemployment assistance, if they are eligible for such transfer pay-
ments. Thus, in the early 2000s, there exist no pure financial incentives for unem-
ployed individuals to participate in ST00, in contrast to the situation in Germany
before 1998. In the 1980s, short–term training was treated in the same way as
longer further training programs. This means that participants who fulfilled certain
eligibility criteria (mainly 720 days of employment subject to social security con-
tributions within the last three years) received an income maintenance allowance
which was more generous than the usual unemployment compensation. Those who
where not eligible to receive income maintenance allowance continued to receive the
means tested unemployment assistance (Bender et al., 2005).
3 Data
3.1 Administrative Data Sets Used
This study uses large administrative data sets for both time periods under investiga-
tion. For the 2000s, the empirical analysis is based on the so-called Integrated Em-
7
ployment Biographies Sample (IEBS), a data set which has recently been made avail-
able by the Federal Employment Office of Germany.7 The IEBS consists of a 2.2%
random sample of individual data drawn from the universe of data records collected
in four different administrative processes: the Employment History (Beschäftigten-
Historik), the Benefit Recipient History (Leistungsempfänger-Historik), the Data on
Job Search Originating from the Applicants Pool Database (Bewerberangebot), and
the Participants-in-Measures Data (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank).8
The Employment History is based on social insurance register data comprising em-
ployment information for employees subject to contributions to the public social
security system. It covers the time period from 1990 to 2004. The main feature of
these data is detailed daily information on the employment of each recorded individ-
ual. We use this information to account for the labor market history of individuals
as well as to measure employment outcomes. For each employment spell, in addition
to start and end dates, data from the Employment History contains information on
personal as well as job and firm characteristics such as wage, industry, or occupation.
The Benefit Recipient History, the second data source, includes daily spells of un-
employment benefit, unemployment assistance and income maintenance allowance
payments individuals received between January 1990 and June 2005. The Benefit
Recipient History provides information on the periods in which individuals were out
of employment and therefore not covered by the Employment History. Moreover,
we use additional information contained in the Benefit Recipients History involving
sanctions and periods of exclusion from benefit receipt that may serve as indicators
for a lack of motivation. Based on the information in the Employment and the
Benefit Recipient History we calculate the individual entitlement periods to unem-
ployment benefits.9
The third data source included in the IEBS is the so-called Data on Job Search
Originating from the Applicants Pool Database, which contains rich information
on individuals searching for jobs covering the period January 2000 to June 2005.
The spells include detailed information concerning job search and personal charac-
teristics, in particular on educational qualifications, nationality, and marital status.
7For detailed information on the IEBS see Hummel et al. (2005) and Bender, Biewen et
al. (2005). Information in English can be found in Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) or on
the website of the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Office
(http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx).
8The data used here has been supplemented with some additional information that are not
available in the standard version.
9For this purpose we rely on Plaßmann (2002) who summarizes the regulations regarding enti-
tlements to unemployment benefits.
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They also provide information on whether the applicant wishes to change occupa-
tion, how many job proposals he or she already got, and about health problems
that might influence employment chances. Finally, the data on applicants include
regional and local identifiers, which we use to link regional and local information,
for example unemployment rates at the district level.
The Participants-in-Measures Data, the fourth data source, contains detailed infor-
mation on participation in public sector sponsored labor market programs covering
the period January 2000 to June 2005. The data consist of spells indicating the
start and end dates at a daily level, the type of the program as well as additional
information. The Data Base of Program Participants allows us not only to identify
participation in short–term training, but also in other programs such as employ-
ment subsidies. This is useful, as it enables us to distinguish between regular and
subsidized employment when evaluating employment outcomes.
For the earlier time period covering the 1980s and 1990s, we use administrative indi-
vidual data from three different sources. These data were assembled for the purpose
of evaluating public sector sponsored training programs, see Bender, Bergemann et
al. (2005) for a detailed description. The first data source is the IAB Employment
Subsample (IAB Beschäftigtenstichprobe, IABS) of the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB), see Bender et al. (2000) and Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chap-
ter 2.1). The IABS is a 1% random sample of all employment records subject to
social insurance contribution in the period 1975–1997. It also contains some infor-
mation on periods of transfer payments from the unemployment insurance. The
second data source is the the Benefit Payment Register (Leistungsempfängerdatei,
LED) of the Federal Employment Office, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chap-
ter 2.2). These data consist of spells on periods of transfer payments granted to
unemployed and program participants in the period 1975–1997. They include very
detailed information about income maintenance payments which allows to identify
participation in different training programs, including the ST8092 programs inves-
tigated here. These benefit data contain more detailed information than the benefit
data available in the IABS. The two data sources were merged to the so–called
IABS–LED data set, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005) for details. Based on the
IABS–LED data we calculate the individual entitlement periods to unemployment
benefits.
As a third data source, we use an administrative survey on training participation,
the so called FuU–data, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chapter 2.3). The
Federal Employment Office collected these data for all participants in further train-
ing, retraining, and other training programs for internal monitoring and statistical
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purposes. For every participant, the FuU–data contain detailed information about
the program and the participant.
The FuU–data were merged with the combined IABS–LED data by social insurance
number and additional covariates. Numerous corrections were implemented in order
to improve the quality of the data, see Bender, Bergemann et al. (2005, chapters 3–4)
and Fitzenberger et al. (2008) for details. While the IABS provides information on
personal characteristics and employment histories, the combination of the transfer
payment data and the training participation data is used to identify the participation
in different types of training programs.
3.2 Sample Selection
In this study, we analyze inflow samples into unemployment consisting of individuals
living in West Germany who became unemployed after having been continuously em-
ployed for at least three months. The beginning of an unemployment spell is defined
as the transition from regular (not marginal) employment to nonemployment and
subsequently being in contact with the employment office (not necessarily immedi-
ately), either through benefit receipt, program participation or a job search spell.10
This way, we focus on individuals closely attached to the labor market, which al-
lows to construct a control group that exhibits a similar employment history as the
treated individuals. Furthermore, the beginning of unemployment defines a natural
time scale to align treated and nontreated individuals. In order to exclude indi-
viduals in formal education or vocational training and individuals eligible for early
retirement schemes, we only consider persons aged between 25 and 53 years at the
beginning of their unemployment spell. Our evaluation focuses on participation in
short–term training as the first training program that is attended over the course of
an unemployment spell. Later participation in other active labor market programs
is regarded as an outcome. Individuals in our control group may participate in
another training program as a first program.
For the evaluation of ST00, we focus on an inflow sample into unemployment between
the beginning of January 2000 and the end of June 2001. The analysis of ST8092
is based on an inflow sample into unemployment from January 1980 to January
1991.11 We consider participation in short–term training within the first two years of
10In the IEBS we can identify subsidized employment and thus exclude this from our definition
of regular employment. This is unfortunately not possible for the 1980s and 1990s.
11This implies that the same individual may appear more than once in our evaluation sample.
We take account of multiple inclusions of the same individual in the sample when calculating the
10
an unemployment spell. Thus, we evaluate ST8092 programs starting from January
1980 until their abolishment in December 1992 and ST00 programs starting between
January 2000 and June 2003. For the earlier time period, the data allow us to follow
all individuals until the end of 1997. Therefore, we are able to estimate long–term
effects of the ST8092 programs for all participants in our data. We follow the
individuals in the more recent sample until the end of 2004.
In the sample covering the early 2000s, we distinguish two types of short–term
training programs: the first one puts more emphasis on qualifying the job seeker
(QST00), while the second one focuses on monitoring and testing the availability
for work (MST00). We argue that the QST00 variant of ST00 is more similar to the
ST8092 programs. For both time periods, we distinguish between treatment starting
during months 0 to 6 of the unemployment spell (stratum 1), treatment starting
during months 7 to 12 (stratum 2), and treatment starting during months 13 to 24
(stratum 3). We consider two outcome variables: the monthly employment status
and participation in a longer–term training program later in the unemployment spell.
The propensity scores and the treatment effects are estimated separately for the
different program types, strata, and men and women. The number of participants
and the size of the control group for each specification are depicted in table 3 in the
appendix.
4 Evaluation Approach
Our goal is to analyze the effect of short–term training programs on two outcome
variables, namely the individual monthly employment dummy and the individual
participation in a longer–term training program.12 The treatment we evaluate is
participating in a short–term training program as a first training program over the
course of an unemployment spell against the alternative of not participating in a
short–term training program as a first training program. This alternative includes
the case of participating in a longer training program as first training program
or no participation in any training program. We estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT) of short–term training as first treatment against this
alternative. Extending the static treatment approach to a dynamic setting, we
follow Sianesi (2004) and apply the standard static treatment approach recursively
standard errors.
12The individual participation is measured as a dummy variable which is equal to one when the
individual participates in a longer–term training program at some time in the future within the
same unemployment spell.
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depending on the elapsed unemployment duration. The implementation builds upon
the approach developed in Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007), Biewen et al. (2007),
and Fitzenberger et al. (2008).
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causality,
see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman et al. (1999). Let the
two potential outcomes be {Y 0, Y 1}, where Y 1 represents the outcome associated
with participation in a short–term training program and Y 0 is the outcome when
the individual does not participate in a short–term training program. For each
individual, only one of the two potential outcomes is observed and the other outcome
is counterfactual. We focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of
participating in a short–term training program against nonparticipation in a short–
term training program at some given elapsed unemployment duration (treatment
versus waiting).
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) argue that a static evaluation approach, which as-
signs unemployed individuals to a treatment group and a nontreatment group based
on the treatment information observed in the data within a fixed time window,
yields biased treatment effects. This is because the definition of the control group
conditions on future outcomes or future treatment. For Sweden, Sianesi (2004) ar-
gues that all unemployed individuals are potential future participants in active labor
market programs, a view which is particularly plausible for countries with compre-
hensive systems of active labor market policies (like Germany). In Germany, active
labor market programs are implemented at a fairly large scale in international com-
parison. While unemployed, job seekers are continuously at risk of being assigned
to an active labor market program. This discussion implies that a purely static
evaluation of the different training programs is not warranted. Following Sianesi
(2003, 2004), we analyze the effects of the first participation in a short–term train-
ing program during the unemployment spell considered conditional on the starting
date of the treatment.
We analyze treatment conditional upon the unemployment spell lasting at least until
the start of the treatment k and this being the first treatment during the unemploy-
ment spell considered. Therefore, the ATT parameter (comparing treatments k and
l) of interest is
θ(u, τ) = E(Y 1(u, τ)|Tu = 1, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0)(1)
−E(Y 0(u, τ)|Tu = 1, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0) ,
where Tu is the dummy variable indicating the start of treatment starting in month
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u of the unemployment spell. Y 1(u, τ), Y 0(u, τ) are the potential outcomes for treat-
ments and nontreatment, respectively, in periods u + τ , where treatment starts in
period u and τ = 0, 1, 2, ..., counts the months since the beginning of treatment. We
compare treatment versus waiting (nonparticipation in the stratum). Note that the
potential outcomes Y 1(u, τ), Y 0(u, τ) differ by the month u when treatment starts.
The outcomes condition upon being unemployed at least until month u. Nonpartic-
ipation involves the possibility of treatment in a later stratum which implies that
Y 0(u, τ) may correspond after while to a post treatment outcome.
The treatment parameter we actually estimate is the average within a stratum
θ(τ) =
∑
u
guθ(u, τ) ,
where the average is taken with respect to the distribution gu of starting dates u
within the stratum.
Our estimated treatment parameter (1) mirrors the decision problem of the case
worker and the unemployed who recurrently during the unemployment spell decide
whether to start any of the programs now or to postpone participation to the future.
We evaluate the effects of treatment assuming the following dynamic version of the
conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA)
E(Y 0(u, τ)|Tu = 1, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X)(2)
= E(Y 0(u, τ)|Tu˜ = 0 for u ≤ u˜ ≤ u¯, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, X) ,
where X are observed characteristics that are time–invariant within an unemploy-
ment stratum and τ ≥ 0, see equation (1) above and the analogous discussion in
Sianesi (2004, p. 137). Tu˜ = 0 indicates nonparticipation between u and u¯ (u¯ is
the end of the stratum of elapsed unemployment considered). We effectively as-
sume that conditional on X, conditional on being unemployed at least until period
u−1, and conditional on not receiving any treatment before the end of the stratum
considered, u¯, individuals are comparable in their nonparticipation outcome.
In our application, we apply propensity score matching building on Rosenbaum and
Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing property of the propensity score in the case
of a binary treatment. To account for the dynamic treatment assignment, we es-
timate the probability of treatment given that unemployment lasts long enough to
make an individual ‘eligible’. For treatment starting during months 1 to 6 (stratum
1), we take the total inflow sample of unemployed, and estimate a Probit model
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for treatment during stratum 1. The nonparticipation group includes those unem-
ployed who either never participate in the treatment or who start a treatment after
month 6. For treatment during strata 2 and 3, the basic sample consists of those
unemployed who are still unemployed in the last month of the previous stratum.
Implicitly, we assume that the actual beginning of treatment within a stratum is
random conditional on X.
We implement a stratified local linear matching approach by imposing that the
matching partners for a treated individual are still unemployed in the month be-
fore treatment starts, i.e. we exactly align treated and nontreated individuals by
elapsed unemployment duration in months. In addition, we exactly align treated
and controls by the calendar month in which the unemployment spell began. The
expected counterfactual outcome for nonparticipation is obtained by means of a lo-
cal linear regression on the propensity score. We use a crossvalidation procedure
to obtain the bandwidth minimizing the squared prediction error for the average of
the nonparticipation–outcome for the nearest neighbors of the treated individuals.13
An estimate for the variance of the estimated treatment effects is obtained through
bootstrapping based on 250 resamples. We resample individuals. This way, we take
account of the sampling variability in the estimated propensity score and we obtain
standard errors which are clustered at the individual level.
As a balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005)
to investigate whether the covariates are balanced sufficiently by matching on the
estimated propensity score. For this purpose, each regressor in a given propensity
score specification is regressed on a flexible polynomial of the predicted propensity
score and interactions of this polynomial with the treatment dummy. We then
determine the number of covariates in each specification for which the balancing
test passes, i.e. the zero hypothesis that the polynomial of the propensity score
interacted with the treatment dummy equals zero is not rejected. Furthermore, we
investigate whether treated and matched nontreated individuals differ significantly
in their outcomes before the beginning of the unemployment spell. We estimate
these differences in the same way as the treatment effects after the beginning of
the program. By construction, treated individuals and their matched counterparts
exhibit the same unemployment duration until the beginning of treatment.
We also investigate effect heterogeneity of the ATT over calender time. For all
treated individuals, we calculate the cumulated individual treatment effects by sum-
ming the individual monthly effects over the post–treatment time period. We then
13This method is an extension of the crossvalidation procedure suggested in Bergemann et al.
(2008).
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run a linear regression of these individual effects on dummy variables for the different
calendar years.
Finally, we need to discuss the plausibility of the DCIA (2) for our application.
As Sianesi (2004), we argue that the participation probability depends upon the
variables determining re–employment prospects once unemployment begins. Conse-
quently, all individuals are considered as matching partners who have left employ-
ment during the same time as the treated individuals (i.e. unemployment started in
the same calendar month) and who have experienced the same elapsed unemploy-
ment duration before program participation. Furthermore, we included a rich set of
individual characteristics and detailed information on previous employment experi-
ence in the propensity score estimation. E.g., we consider skill information, regional
information, occupational status, industry as well as information on the remaining
entitlement period to unemployment benefits. We use detailed information on past
employment and unemployment spells to proxy for ‘soft factors’ that may influence
participation such as the ability or motivation of the unemployed. As participation
occurred at a fairly large scale, we argue further that assignment was not very tar-
geted and driven by the regional supply of programs. Moreover, caseworkers had
little guidance on ‘what works for whom’. Supporting our point of view, Schneider
et al. (2006) suggest that until the end of 2002 assignment to training was strongly
driven by the supply of available courses.14
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation of the Propensity Scores
We fitted the propensity scores separately for each of the 18 groups. In each case,
we run an extensive specification search. The final specification was chosen based
on economic considerations, statistical significance of the variables included, and the
balancing tests described above.15 The final specifications include 15 to 31 covari-
ates. The Smith and Todd (2005) balancing test is passed in almost all cases at a
1% significance level, except for one specification where we reject the null hypothesis
14For the evaluation of the employment effects of job creation schemes in 1999/2000 based on
administrative data for Germany, Caliendo et al. (2004) were able to use a survey asking about
the motivation of participants (such information is not available for our data). It turned out that
both using administrative data and controlling for these motivational variables did not result in
noticeably different estimated program effects compared to using administrative data only. This
evidence also supports our point of view.
15Detailed estimation results are available in the additional appendix to this paper.
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for one regressor when using the quartic of the propensity score. Even regarding the
5% level we still pass 895 of 928 tests (both cubic and quartic regressions counted).
A closer look at the estimation results for the propensity scores reveals that the
following information is particularly relevant: region, age, schooling degree, pro-
fessional qualification, family status, children, foreign or German nationality, time
spent in different labor market states during the last three years, remaining claim
on unemployment benefits, industry of last employment, last occupation, last wage,
reason for the end of last employment, year or quarter the person became unem-
ployed in, health status, past health problems, information on whether a program
was canceled within the last three years, penalties and disqualification from benefits
within the last three years, participation in a program with a social work component,
indication of lack of motivation within the last three years.16
5.2 Estimated Treatment Effects
The evaluation results for short–term training as first training program vs. waiting
are shown in figures 1 to 3. Each graph displays the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT), i.e. the difference between the actual and the counterfactual
employment outcome averaged over those individuals who participate in the program
under consideration. More precisely, we compare the actual employment outcome of
the treated to the employment outcome these individuals would have had, had they
not taken part in short–term training as a first training program in the respective
time window of their unemployment spell. We distinguish between programs starting
in three different time windows (strata) of elapsed unemployment: 0 to 6 months
(stratum 1), 7 to 12 months (stratum 2), and 13 to 24 months (stratum 3). We
evaluate treatment effects at different points in time. On the time axis in our
graphs, positive values denote months since the program start, while negative values
represent pre–unemployment months. We omit the period between the start of
unemployment and the start of the program where both control and treatment group
are unemployed. The dashed lines around the estimated ATT are bootstrapped 95
percent confidence bands. Treatment effects for a particular month are statistically
significant if zero is not contained in the confidence band.
Figure 1 shows the estimated treatment effects for the short–term training programs
16The variables family status, reason for the end of last employment, health status, past health
problems, penalties and disqualification from benefits within the last three years, participation in
a program with a social work component, indication of lack of motivation within the last three
years can not be generated in the older data. We instead hope to capture the information by using
detailed variables on the individuals labor market history.
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in the early 2000s with a strong focus on qualification (QST00). The results for men
are given in the left column, while those for women are shown in the right column.
During the program and in the first time following the end of the program, partici-
pants typically have a lower monthly employment probability than they would have
had if they had not participated in the program. This is the so–called lock–in effect.
Figure 1 suggests relatively short (1 to 4 months) and not very pronounced lock–in
effects. These lock–in effects are a bit deeper for stratum 1 (about 7 percentage
points) than for the later strata (2 to 4 percentage points). After the short lock–in
period, the difference between actual and counterfactual employment outcomes of
participants turns positive. We find significant positive effects for men in the second
and third stratum (i.e. those men who have been unemployed for at least half a year
before entering a program) and for women in the first and second stratum, but not
in the third stratum. However, the point estimates for the latter are positive after
six months. The largest employment effects occur between month 12 and month
18. In the four groups with significant effects, the size of the effects reaches 9 to 17
percentage points. After 18 months, the effects tend to decline a little, but positive
ATTs of 7 to 12 percentage points persist until the end of the observation period
(18 to 36 months after program start depending on the stratum). These long lasting
effects are quite remarkable given that the programs last only a few weeks. As we
do not exclude participants who attend a second training program after short–term
training, but regard the second program as an outcome, it could well be that the
long–term effects are to some degree due to longer training programs which have
been started as a result of the short–term training program. This would imply that
short–term training serves as a bridge into a more intensive training programs and
this combination eventually leads to positive employment effects.
Figure 2 presents the corresponding results for the short–term training programs in
the early 2000s we classified as having a strong focus on testing the availability and
willingness to work as well as the skills of job seekers (MST00). The graphs suggest
that, while the point estimates of the monthly average treatment effects are mostly
positive, they generally fail to be clearly significant. The only exception are women
who receive treatment in months 7 to 12 (stratum 2) of their unemployment spell.
After a small and very short lock–in–effect, we first observe a small and insignificant
positive effect. Rising steadily over more than two years, it turns significant after
9 months and eventually reaches 16 percentage points. This picture fits into the
scenario that part of the participants attend a second program as a result of the
MST00 program and this combination of programs eventually may lead to positive
employment effects. The trend of the treatment effect is similar for men and women
in stratum 1, but in these cases the level is much lower and the effect is insignificant.
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The lock–in–effects show a similar picture for MST00 as for QST00. In sum, partic-
ipants of MST00 seem to have benefited less from their program than participants
of QST00 from the program they were assigned to.
Results for short–term programs in the period 1980–1992 (ST8092) are given in
figure 3. The estimated monthly average treatment effects are positive after an
initial lock–in–effect. Remarkably, the lock–in–period is typically longer for ST8092
than for ST00. Also, the monthly ATTs of ST8092 are mostly smaller than those of
QST00 and statistically insignificant. Only for women unemployed for more than
one year (stratum 3), the results show significantly positive treatment effects of 7
to 10 percentage points between month 6 and month 20 after program start. For
the other groups the effects are – although for the time after the lock–in–period
always positive – insignificant. Interestingly, for most groups the employment effect
increases between month 18 and month 26 after treatment start. As discussed
before, this is likely due to participation in another training program as a result of
participation in short–term training. In sum, ST8092 programs were less successful
in bringing people back to employment compared to ST00, in particular to QST00.
Table 5 shows averages of the monthly ATT’s from month 6 after program start until
the end of the observation period as a way of condensing employment effects after
the end of the lock–in–period. In four cases for QST00 and two cases for MST00,
the figures reported in table 5 suggest highly significant employment effects between
6 and 14 percentage points, for the other groups the effects are smaller and not (or
only slightly) significant. The results for the ST8092 programs suggest significantly
positive ATTs for women in stratum 2 and 3 and for men in stratum 2 in the range
6.2 to 7.4 percentage points despite the mostly insignificant point estimates in figure
3. The effects for the three other cases are smaller in size and not significant.
Table 4 shows gains and losses in months employed cumulated over up to two years
(four years for the ST8092 programs, respectively) after program start as a way of
condensing the graphical results in figures 1 to 3. This measures by how much a
participation in short–term training increases the time spent in employment in a
given time period, when initial negative and subsequent positive employment effects
are weighed against each other. While the gains are very small or not even positive
over the first 6 months, they increase for most groups over a longer period. The
positive employment effects of QST00 are confirmed again. The effects of QST00
cumulated over 24 months are in general larger than those of MST00 and ST8092.
In the cases where we find significant effects after 24 months, these lie in a range
between one and two and a half months. For example, men and women participating
in QST00 after having been unemployed between 7 and 12 months (stratum 2)
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gain 2.4 months in employment during the first 24 months after the program start.
Women participating in MST00 in stratum 2 gain 2.6 months in employment in
two years. For the ST8092 programs, there are surprisingly high gains for women
who were long–term unemployed before the program. After 48 months, we find
significantly positive cumulated employment effects of ST8092 programs (in one
case significance is given only at the 10% level) for women in stratum 2 and 3 and
for men in stratum 2.
Next, table 6 reports the estimated treatment effects on the participation rates.
This means that instead of the employment effect we estimate the average effect
of the short–term training program on the probability to participate in a longer–
term further training program at least once during the remaining unemployment
spell after the start of the short–term training program. All effects are positive
and, with the exception of QST00 in stratum 2, they are all significant. Incidently,
the employment effects for QST00 in stratum 2 are the highest among all QST00
cases while the participation effects are the lowest. In most cases, the participation
effects are higher for women than for men and the effects are mostly higher for
the ST8092 programs compared to short–term training in the 2000s. Furthermore,
the effects are much higher for MST00 compared to QST00. This is in line with
what one would expect: an important goal of MST00 is to define a path back into
employment, including for some job seekers participation in a more intensive training
program. A limited skill upgrade to directly enhance placement is a strong focus
of QST00, as a result future program participation is a bit less of an issue. For
the ST8092 programs, guiding needy job seekers into a long–term training program
was an official goal. The estimated effects of participation rates reflect this goal, in
particular for female participants who show an 18 to 25 percentage points higher
probability to participate in a longer training program.
This study investigates program effects of ST8092 programs over 13 calendar years.
Given this very long period, one could suspect that the employment effects differ
over calendar time. Possibly, the activation effect of such programs is higher for
the hard–to–place when unemployment is low or the programs give the unemployed
an additional edge when unemployment is high. In order to investigate this type
of potential effect heterogeneity, we regress the average individual treatment effects
after the lock–in–period (summarized in table 5) on an intercept, year dummies,
and the individual elapsed unemployment duration to investigate whether the ef-
fects differ between years. Bootstrap standard errors are calculated based on the
resamples which are also used to bootstrap the standard errors of the effect esti-
mates. According to the results of these regressions, the ATTs do not differ over
19
time: a chi–square test for joint significance of the year dummies does not suggest
any effect heterogeneity (see table 7). Thus, there is no evidence for the business
cycle affecting the employment effects of short–term training, a finding which is in
contrast to the results for longer training programs in Lechner and Wunsch (2006).
6 Conclusions
Recently, there has been a greater emphasis on job search assistance, monitoring
and testing work availability, as well as limited training to activate the unemployed
(OECD 2007). In Germany, the focus on activation strategies is reflected in the
recent shift away from traditional longer further training programs typically lasting
a couple of months up to 2 years to short–term training programs (ST00) lasting
at most 12 weeks. In fact, ST00 have become the largest program in Germany
regarding the number of participants with 1.07 Million individuals entering such a
program in 2007 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2007, pp. 54, 57). Between 1980 and
1992, a similar large scale short–term training program was in place in Germany.
These were the ‘programs according to §41a Employment Promotion Act’ (ST8092).
This paper estimates the effects of short–term training programs in West Germany
both for the time period 1980 to 1992 and 2000 to 2003 regarding both future em-
ployment and future participation in longer training programs. This is the first
paper to analyze these programs for the earlier time period and to estimate long–
run effects on outcomes. Our results show that short–term training shows mostly
persistently positive and often significant employment effects. The effects are partic-
ularly strong when participation starts during months 7 to 12 of the unemployment
spell. We tend to find smaller effects for short–term training starting during the
second year of the unemployment spell. When short–term training focuses on test-
ing and monitoring search effort, there are slightly smaller effects compared to when
the focus is on training only. The lock–in periods lasted longer in the 1980s and
1990s compared to the early 2000s. Short–term training results in higher future
participation in longer training programs and this effect was much stronger for the
earlier time period. The employment effects of the ST8092 programs did not change
significantly by year between 1980 and 1992, i.e. there is no evidence for business
cycle effects in contrast to the results for longer training programs in Lechner and
Wunsch (2006).
Our findings most likely reflect a change in active labor market policy between 1992
and 2000. In the 2000s, there is a strong focus on activating the unemployed. In
20
contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s it was accepted policy to ‘give the unemployed
some time’ and to encourage them to participate in longer training programs when
this seemed advisable and the unemployed were hard to place. Our results suggest
that the policy reorientation towards activation did not result in worse employment
outcomes. If anything, as far as comparable, ST00 programs with a focus on training
show better employment effects. As a caveat, we have to acknowledge, however, that
the estimated treatment effects for the two time periods are obtained for different
selective treatment samples, i.e. the effects can not be compared without accounting
for these differences.
The fact that we find some long lasting effects of short–term training may be sur-
prising given their short duration. These programs by themselves do not provide a
sizeable human capital investment. Future research should investigate the hypothe-
sis that the positive program effects can be traced back to the higher participation
rates in longer training programs. However, as one piece of evidence against this
hypothesis, we find that in the two cases with no significant participation effects the
employment effects of ST00 are particularly high. However, a thorough investiga-
tion of the hypothesis would require an evaluation approach for multiple sequential
treatments as e.g. the one developed by Lechner (2004), but it remains an open
question whether the stringent identifying assumptions required are satisfied in ap-
plications like ours. As a final caveat, an overall assessment of the microeconomic
effects of short–term training is not possible, because the necessary information for
a comprehensive cost–benefit–analysis is lacking in our data.
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Appendix
Table 1: Entries into Active Labor Market Programs in West Germany from 1979–
1992 (in Thousand)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Training programs 209 247 280 266 306
– further training 149 162 190 189 220
– short-term training 0.7 14 25 23 24
– retraining 31 38 47 42 42
– job training 29 33 17 11 20
Job creation schemes 20 15 14 8 23
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Training programs 353 409 530 596 566
– further training 260 298 374 420 420
– short–term training 30 38 52 63 29
– retraining 43 45 59 65 66
– job training 19 28 45 49 51
Job creation schemes 26 34 41 42 38
1989 1990 1991 1992
Training programs 490 574 594 575
– further training 361 383 421 418
– short–term training 27 59 53 47
– retraining 61 63 70 81
– job training 41 68 49 29
Job creation schemes 28 27 28 18
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1980-1993), Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1985, 1994).
25
Table 2: Entries into Active Labor Market Programs in Germany and West Germany
from 1999–2004 (in Thousand)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany
Qualification programs 1,108 1,221 1,069 1,537 1,502 1,548
– further and retraining 491 552 450 456 255 185
– short–term training 432 477 565 877 1,064 1,188
Employment subsidies 538 459 465 544 808 950
Placement and advisory services 532 601 742 934 2,920 5,134
Job creation schemes 353 314 246 220 194 170
Specific measures for youths 244 263 265 294 389 408
Other 312 391 516 457 212 309
Total 3,087 3,249 3,304 3,985 6,025 8,520
West Germany
Qualification programs 714 770 643 972 985 1,038
– further and retraining 307 338 261 273 161 124
– short–term training 265 286 339 545 690 789
Employment subsidies 245 225 206 245 365 481
Placement and advisory services 286 279 296 375 1,281 2,797
Job creation schemes 96 89 73 63 39 42
Specific measures for youths 181 193 191 210 262 270
Other 231 296 370 345 17 175
Total 1,753 1,852 1,778 2,210 2,949 4,803
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).
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Table 3: Participation in short–term Training as a First Training Program for the
Inflow Samples into Unemployment
Stratum Months 1 to 6 Months 7 to 12 Months 13 to 24
ST8092
Male Participants 165 201 183
Male Control Group 59921a 25674a 15631
Female Participants 145 145 167
Female Control Group 35782a 22970 17020
ST00
Male Participants QST00 559 221 211
Male Participants MST00 531 177 214
Male Control Group 20979 8337 5122
Female Participants QST00 537 214 130
Female Participants MST00 325 126 115
Female Control Group 13848 7070 4975
aFor these three groups, we randomly selected half of the available non–participants due to
computer constraints.
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Table 4: Cumulated Treatment Effects
QST00, Men
6 months 12 months 24 monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.145 (0.090) -0.015 (0.187) 0.262 (0.378)
Stratum 2 0.274 (0.139)∗∗ 1.005 (0.308)∗∗∗ 2.429 (0.657)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.319 (0.108)∗∗∗ 0.799 (0.241)∗∗∗ 1.518 (0.409)∗∗∗
QST00, Women
6 months 12 months 24 monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.080 (0.083) 0.369 (0.191)∗ 1.197 (0.422)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 -0.009 (0.139) 0.669 (0.313)∗∗ 2.419 (0.699)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.108 (0.089) 0.013 (0.254) 0.224 (0.482)
MST00, Men
6 months 12 months 24 monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.142 (0.089) -0.167 (0.191) -0.175 (0.403)
Stratum 2 -0.029 (0.115) 0.142 (0.277) 0.378 (0.560)
Stratum 3 0.166 (0.096)∗ 0.557 (0.236)∗∗ 0.984 (0.393)∗∗
MST00, Women
6 months 12 months 24 monthsa
Stratum 1 -0.203 (0.102)∗∗ -0.322 (0.230) -0.044 (0.452)
Stratum 2 0.223 (0.162) 0.907 (0.404)∗∗ 2.590 (0.896)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.038 (0.107) 0.265 (0.277) 0.533 (0.498)
ST8092, Men
6 months 12 months 24 months 48 months
Stratum 1 -0.448 (0.143)∗∗∗ -0.343 (0.315) -0.050 (0.631) 1.308 (1.274)
Stratum 2 -0.285 (0.118)∗∗ -0.004 (0.300) 0.910 (0.627) 2.336 (1.168)∗∗
Stratum 3 -0.042 (0.116) 0.161 (0.258) 0.522 (0.552) 1.271 (1.236)
ST8092, Women
6 months 12 months 24 months 48 months
Stratum 1 -0.150 (0.142) 0.039 (0.342) 0.289 (0.770) 0.917 (1.501)
Stratum 2 -0.302 (0.154)∗ 0.019 (0.389) 0.910 (0.844) 2.813 (1.595)∗
Stratum 3 0.130 (0.104) 0.613 (0.245)∗∗ 1.675 (0.543)∗∗∗ 3.124 (1.122)∗∗∗
a In stratum 3 the treatment effects are summed over 19 months.
Note: Sum of the monthly treatment effects from month zero (program start). ∗∗∗ = statistically
significant at 1%, ∗∗ = at 5%, ∗ = at 10%, bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 5: Average ATT after Lock–in–Period
QST00
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.028 (0.016)∗ 0.070 (0.020)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.111 (0.031)∗∗∗ 0.130 (0.034)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.092 (0.026)∗∗∗ 0.025 (0.032)
MST00
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.014 (0.019) 0.024 (0.019)
Stratum 2 0.027 (0.025) 0.143 (0.042)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.063 (0.025)∗∗ 0.038 (0.032)
ST8092
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.043 (0.029) 0.025 (0.034)
Stratum 2 0.062 (0.027)∗∗ 0.074 (0.036)∗∗
Stratum 3 0.030 (0.028) 0.071 (0.026)∗∗∗
Note: Average of the monthly treatment effects from month six since program start until the end
of the observation period (until month 48 for ST8092 programs). ∗∗∗ = statistically significant at
1%, ∗∗ = at 5%, ∗ = at 10%, bootstrapped standard errors.
Table 6: ATT for Participation Rates
QST00
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.083 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.063 (0.018)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.016 (0.025) 0.025 (0.031)
Stratum 3 0.047 (0.024)∗∗ 0.106 (0.036)∗∗∗
MST00
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.164 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.175 (0.026)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.183 (0.032)∗∗∗ 0.200 (0.045)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.132 (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.110 (0.034)∗∗∗
ST8092
Men Women
Stratum 1 0.092 (0.033)∗∗∗ 0.180 (0.038)∗∗∗
Stratum 2 0.218 (0.034)∗∗∗ 0.254 (0.044)∗∗∗
Stratum 3 0.194 (0.041)∗∗∗ 0.229 (0.037)∗∗∗
Note: Treatment effects until the end of the observation period (until month 48 for ST8092 pro-
grams) ∗∗∗ = statistically significant at 1%, ∗∗ = at 5%, ∗ = at 10%, bootstrapped standard
errors.
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Table 7: Test of Heterogeneity of Employment Effects over Time
χ2–Statistic (p–Value)
Men Women
Stratum 1 8.06 (0.701) 2.91 (0.992)
Stratum 2 15.94 (0.143) 12.79 (0.235)
Stratum 3 10.32 (0.502) 7.45 (0.762)
Note: Test on joint significance of all year dummies in a regression of the individual treatment
effects averaged over the months after program start (see table 5) on an intercept, year dummies,
and elapsed unemployment duration. Empirical standard errors are calculated from bootstrap
resamples.
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Figure 1: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
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treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa.
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Figure 2: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
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treatment (≥ 0) months on the abscissa.
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Figure 3: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)
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Additional Appendix to: Déjà Vu? Short–Term
Training in Germany 1982–1992 and 2000–2003
Note: The following material is made available as additional information
for the paper “Déjà Vu? Short–Term Training in Germany 1982–1992
and 2000–2003”.
Variable Definitions for the 2000–2003 Sample
Label Definition
Personal Attributes
female 1 if female, 0 otherwise
agegroup age in 6 groups
foreigner 1 if citizenship is not German, 0 otherwise
qualification 1 no degree, 2 vocational training degree, 3 university or tech-
nical college degree
schooling 1 no schooling degree, 2 Hauptschulabschluss or Mittlere Reife
/Fachoberschule (degrees reached after completion of the 9th
or 10th grade), 3 Fachhochschulreife or Abitur/Hochschulreife
(degrees reached after completion of the 12th or 13th grade)
health 1 no health problems mentioned, 2 health problems, but con-
sidered without impact on placement, 3 health problems con-
sidered to have an impact on placement
pasthealth same categories as health, but referring to the past two years
before the beginning of the unemployment spell
disabled 1 if disabled, 0 otherwise
married 1 missing, 2 married, 3 not married
child 1 if at least one child, 0 otherwise
youngchild 1 if at least one child younger than 10 years, 0 otherwise
Last Employment
occupation occupation of last employment in 7 categories
industry industry of last employment in 6 categories
endlastjob 2 termination of last occupation by employer, 3 by employee,
4 limited in time, 5 other and missing
waged daily wage in the last job(s) before the beginning of the un-
employment spell
<continued on next page>
1
Label Definition
ddssec ddsec is 1 if earnings are within the social security thresholds
lnwage log(waged) interacted with ddssec
Employment and Program History
problemgroup 1 if participation in a program with a social work component
within the last three years, 0 otherwise
pasttreatcancel 1 if abandonment of a program in the past according to the
benefit data, 0 otherwise
penalty 1 if the unemployed had a period of disqualification from ben-
efits within the last three years, 0 otherwise
motivationlack 1 if within the last three years there is information, that the
person did not appear regularly at the labor office, on lack of
cooperation, availability or similar
countemp, coun-
tub, countua,
countsub, coun-
toos, countcon
number of days within the last three years before the begin-
ning of unemployment spent in regular employment, receiv-
ing unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, subsis-
tance payment, out of sample, in contact with the labor office,
respectively
dcount... 1 if the respective count variable is larger than 0, 0 otherwise
demp6, demp12,
demp24,
demp6_12,
demp12_24
1 if in regular employment 6, 12, 24, 6 and 12 and 12 and 24
months, respectively, before the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell
claimg remaining claim on unemployment benefit in four categories
Regional Information
area German Bundesländer aggregated into 6 categories. 1 SH, NI,
HB, HH; 2 NW, 3 HE, RP, SL; 4 BY, BW; 5 MV, BB, BE; 6
SN, ST, TH
region classification of the districts of residence according to local
labor market conditions in 5 groups
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
quarter quarter of the end of the last employment (from 1 to 6)
Note: If not mentioned otherwise, variables are defined relative to the beginning of the time window
of elapsed unemployment duration. Variables in categories are used as dummies, i.e. agegroup1 is
1 if agegroup takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise.
2
Estimated Propensity Scores for the 2000–2003 Sample
Participation Probit for QST00, Males
Treatment QST00, Female=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup1 -0.166 (0.098)∗ -0.160 (0.120)
agegroup12 0.001 (0.041)
agegroup2 -0.123 (0.088) -0.090 (0.102)
agegroup4 -0.002 (0.090) -0.082 (0.107)
agegroup5 -0.080 (0.105) 0.214 (0.102)∗∗
agegroup6 0.140 (0.106) 0.145 (0.113)
area2 -0.082 (0.081) -0.151 (0.085)∗
area3 -0.008 (0.097) -0.125 (0.113)
area4 -0.129 (0.112) -0.319 (0.130)∗∗
child 0.116 (0.048)∗∗ 0.087 (0.067) 0.179 (0.071)∗∗
claimg0 -0.031 (0.105) 0.043 (0.095)
claimg1 0.130 (0.103)
claimg2 0.116 (0.088) -0.124 (0.085) -0.072 (0.101)
claimg3 0.096 (0.098)
claimg34 -0.383 (0.116)∗∗∗ -0.210 (0.119)∗
claimg4 0.169 (0.108)
countcon 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000)∗
countemp 0 (0.000)∗∗ 0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.068 (0.053) 0.021 (0.079) 0.029 (0.086)
dcountoos 0.011 (0.078) -0.148 (0.086)∗
dcountsub 0.214 (0.071)∗∗∗
ddssec 0.607 (0.242)∗∗
demp12_24 0.195 (0.074)∗∗∗ -0.045 (0.115) 0.055 (0.144)
demp24 -0.150 (0.076)∗∗ 0.010 (0.121) 0.009 (0.144)
demp6 0.026 (0.063) -0.033 (0.097) 0.292 (0.114)∗∗
endlastjob2 0.045 (0.046)
endlastjob4 0.236 (0.064)∗∗∗
industry3 -0.162 (0.086)∗ -0.267 (0.095)∗∗∗
industry5 0.095 (0.078) -0.192 (0.099)∗
industry6 -0.027 (0.097) -0.151 (0.104)
lnwaged -0.135 (0.053)∗∗
married2 0.165 (0.044)∗∗∗ 0.167 (0.065)∗∗ 0.281 (0.071)∗∗∗
motivationlack 0.105 (0.055)∗
occupation1 0.102 (0.073)
occupation3 -0.013 (0.065)
occupation5 0.243 (0.080)∗∗∗
occupation6 0.139 (0.086)
occupation7 -0.002 (0.105)
problemgroup 0.224 (0.092)∗∗
quarter1 -0.199 (0.054)∗∗∗ -0.196 (0.105)∗ -0.154 (0.104)
quarter2 0.029 (0.104) -0.211 (0.117)∗
quarter3 0.091 (0.095) -0.182 (0.110)∗
quarter4 -0.120 (0.051)∗∗ -0.062 (0.094) -0.122 (0.100)
quarter5 -0.086 (0.049)∗
quarter6 0.121 (0.093) -0.115 (0.101)
region2 -0.237 (0.097)∗∗ -0.092 (0.096)
region4 0.090 (0.104) 0.157 (0.115)
region5 0.038 (0.095) 0.225 (0.115)∗
schooling3 0.143 (0.060)∗∗
youngchild -0.048 (0.062)
_cons -2.633 (0.169)∗∗∗ -2.354 (0.231)∗∗∗ -1.961 (0.265)∗∗∗
N 21538 8558 5333
3
Results for Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test, QST00 Males
Treatment QST00, Female=0, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 28 29 30 30
Stratum 2 27 30 31 31
Stratum 3 28 30 31 31
Treatment QST00, Female=0, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 28 28 30 30
Stratum 2 26 27 31 31
Stratum 3 31 31 31 31
4
Participation Probit for MST00, Males
Treatment MST00, Female=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup1 0.063 (0.095)
agegroup2 0.231 (0.080)∗∗∗
agegroup56 -0.033 (0.050) 0.006 (0.098)
child 0.189 (0.072)∗∗∗ 0.115 (0.068)∗
claimg0 -0.027 (0.079) -0.059 (0.215) 0.142 (0.097)
claimg0_dcountoos 0.370 (0.206)∗
claimg1 0.053 (0.084) -0.040 (0.195) -0.085 (0.108)
claimg1_dcountoos 0.286 (0.204)
claimg2 0.221 (0.107)∗∗
claimg34 0.008 (0.047) -0.124 (0.117)
countub -0 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.091 (0.054)∗ 0.129 (0.084)
dcountoos 0.064 (0.042) -0.169 (0.091)∗
dcountsub 0.237 (0.112)∗∗
dcountub -0.135 (0.046)∗∗∗
demp12 0.005 (0.151) 0.029 (0.138)
demp24 -0.029 (0.080) 0.054 (0.073)
demp6_12 0.124 (0.050)∗∗ 0.106 (0.153) -0.127 (0.133)
endlastjob2 0.102 (0.046)∗∗
endlastjob3 -0.172 (0.117)
endlastjob4 0.135 (0.071)∗
foreigner -0.291 (0.096)∗∗∗
health2 0.284 (0.127)∗∗
health3 -0.110 (0.135)
industry2 0.520 (0.171)∗∗∗
industry3 0.314 (0.171)∗ -0.093 (0.099)
industry4 0.432 (0.170)∗∗ -0.067 (0.085)
industry5 0.500 (0.173)∗∗∗ -0.150 (0.103)
industry6 0.350 (0.180)∗ -0.321 (0.121)∗∗∗
married2 0.129 (0.042)∗∗∗ 0.220 (0.069)∗∗∗ 0.234 (0.071)∗∗∗
motivationlack 0.109 (0.055)∗∗ -0.027 (0.078)
pasthealth1 0.346 (0.123)∗∗∗
pasthealth2 -0.063 (0.172)
pasthealth3 0.312 (0.149)∗∗
penalty 0.219 (0.126)∗
qualification1 0.107 (0.041)∗∗∗ 0.182 (0.068)∗∗∗ 0.041 (0.066)
quarter1 0 (0.070)
quarter3 0.008 (0.075)
quarter4 -0.056 (0.071) 0.098 (0.088)
quarter5 -0.034 (0.070) 0.186 (0.084)∗∗
quarter6 0.161 (0.071)∗∗ 0.141 (0.092)
region2 0.536 (0.079)∗∗∗
region3 0.278 (0.074)∗∗∗ -0.037 (0.086) -0.140 (0.082)∗
region4 -0.194 (0.126) -0.258 (0.121)∗∗
region5 0.122 (0.080) -0.169 (0.102)∗ -0.283 (0.101)∗∗∗
schooling3 0.090 (0.057)
_cons -2.961 (0.207)∗∗∗ -2.406 (0.170)∗∗∗ -2.176 (0.206)∗∗∗
N 21510 8514 5336
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Results for Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test, MST00 Males
Treatment MST00, Female=0, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 26 28 28 28
Stratum 2 23 23 23 23
Stratum 3 23 23 25 25
Treatment MST00, Female=0, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 26 27 28 28
Stratum 2 20 23 23 23
Stratum 3 22 23 25 25
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Participation Probit for QST00, Females
Treatment QST00, Female=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup12 -0.113 (0.048)∗∗ -0.228 (0.099)∗∗
agegroup4 0.193 (0.080)∗∗
agegroup56 -0.021 (0.053) 0.155 (0.081)∗ 0.158 (0.094)∗
child 0.116 (0.045)∗∗ 0.223 (0.068)∗∗∗ 0.197 (0.088)∗∗
claimg0 -0.042 (0.127) 0.187 (0.122) 0.242 (0.118)∗∗
claimg2 0.166 (0.095)∗ 0.254 (0.109)∗∗ 0.143 (0.126)
claimg34 0.173 (0.100)∗ 0.126 (0.149) 0.153 (0.141)
claimg34_married2 0.242 (0.170)
countcon 0 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)∗ 0 (0.000)
countemp 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) -0 (0.001)
countoos 0.001 (0.000) 0 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.135 (0.057)∗∗
dcountoos -0.084 (0.054)
dcountua 0.170 (0.108)
dcountub 0.087 (0.088)
ddssec -4.380 (1.263)∗∗∗
demp12 0.049 (0.133) 0.075 (0.188) -0.178 (0.277)
demp12_24 -0.037 (0.076) 0.072 (0.120) 0.239 (0.159)
demp6 0.027 (0.092) 0.027 (0.126) 0.235 (0.159)
demp6_12 -0.015 (0.136) 0.034 (0.198) 0.145 (0.275)
endlastjob2 0.227 (0.056)∗∗∗ 0.375 (0.084)∗∗∗
endlastjob3 0.291 (0.075)∗∗∗ 0.139 (0.123)
endlastjob4 0.081 (0.072) 0.122 (0.113)
foreigner -0.301 (0.115)∗∗∗
health2 -0.271 (0.143)∗
health3 0.079 (0.139) 0.234 (0.117)∗∗
industry3 0.282 (0.118)∗∗
industry4 0.062 (0.058) 0.172 (0.085)∗∗
industry5 0.068 (0.067) 0.044 (0.102)
industry6 0.015 (0.061) 0.030 (0.090)
lnwaged 2.241 (0.660)∗∗∗
lnwagedsq -0.281 (0.086)∗∗∗
married2 0.222 (0.044)∗∗∗ 0.200 (0.074)∗∗∗ 0.455 (0.083)∗∗∗
motivationlack -0.082 (0.085)
pasthealth2 0.326 (0.138)∗∗
pasthealth3 -0.041 (0.147)
pasttreatcancel 0.155 (0.339)
penalty 0.332 (0.159)∗∗
problemgroup 0.240 (0.117)∗∗
region2 0.075 (0.058)
region3 0.026 (0.096)
region4 0.086 (0.123)
region5 0.114 (0.100)
_cons -2.408 (0.224)∗∗∗ -3.386 (0.470)∗∗∗ -2.733 (0.521)∗∗∗
N 14385 7284 5105
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Results for Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test, QST00 Females
Treatment QST00, Female=1, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 30 31 31 31
Stratum 2 28 29 30 30
Stratum 3 15 15 15 15
Treatment QST00, Female=1, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 30 31 31 31
Stratum 2 24 29 30 30
Stratum 3 14 14 15 15
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Participation Probit for MST00, Females
Treatment MST00, Female=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
agegroup1 -0.175 (0.117)
agegroup2 -0.207 (0.106)∗
agegroup4 0.261 (0.115)∗∗
agegroup5 0.280 (0.116)∗∗
agegroup56 -0.262 (0.098)∗∗∗ -0.169 (0.123)
agegroup6 0.372 (0.117)∗∗∗
area3 -0.214 (0.111)∗
child 0.213 (0.055)∗∗∗ 0.104 (0.089)
claimg0 -0.045 (0.117) 0.324 (0.147)∗∗ 0.178 (0.117)
claimg1 -0.070 (0.109) 0.105 (0.126) -0.053 (0.132)
claimg3 0.098 (0.101) -0.143 (0.133)
claimg34 -0.066 (0.129)
claimg3_dcountoos -0.114 (0.116)
claimg4 0.506 (0.140)∗∗∗ 0.023 (0.164)
claimg4_dcountoos -0.380 (0.182)∗∗
countoos 0 (0.000) -0 (0.000)
countub -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)
dcountcon 0.066 (0.062) 0.073 (0.094)
dcountoos 0.154 (0.092)∗
dcountsub 0.264 (0.163)
demp12 0.059 (0.090) -0.174 (0.242) -0.288 (0.127)∗∗
demp12_24 0.045 (0.131)
demp24 0.037 (0.130) 0.021 (0.156) -0.120 (0.141)
demp6 0.095 (0.087)
demp6_12 0.295 (0.245)
endlastjob2 0.147 (0.065)∗∗ 0.161 (0.089)∗
endlastjob3 0.229 (0.089)∗∗
endlastjob4 0.138 (0.080)∗ 0.189 (0.116)
lncountemp -0.087 (0.092) -1.548 (1.464) -0.626 (1.361)
lncountempsq 0.135 (0.131) 0.062 (0.119)
married2 0.201 (0.054)∗∗∗ 0.271 (0.080)∗∗∗ 0.193 (0.087)∗∗
onlyparttime -0.120 (0.066)∗
parttime -0.005 (0.079) -0.073 (0.084)
qualification1 0.148 (0.053)∗∗∗ 0.173 (0.083)∗∗
quarter1 0.295 (0.087)∗∗∗ 0.282 (0.140)∗∗
quarter2 0.235 (0.092)∗∗ 0.263 (0.149)∗ 0.141 (0.167)
quarter3 0.275 (0.088)∗∗∗ 0.375 (0.136)∗∗∗ 0.169 (0.162)
quarter4 0.317 (0.151)∗∗
quarter5 0.350 (0.083)∗∗∗ 0.225 (0.137)∗ 0.232 (0.151)
quarter6 0.231 (0.091)∗∗ 0.413 (0.136)∗∗∗ 0.337 (0.153)∗∗
region2 0.457 (0.100)∗∗∗ 0.312 (0.132)∗∗ 0.460 (0.169)∗∗∗
region3 0.309 (0.091)∗∗∗ 0.426 (0.103)∗∗∗ 0.355 (0.156)∗∗
region4 0.129 (0.154)
region5 0.150 (0.097) 0.099 (0.172)
schooling3 0.084 (0.064)
youngchild -0.232 (0.121)∗ 0.353 (0.105)∗∗∗
_cons -2.563 (0.540)∗∗∗ 1.394 (4.026) -1.093 (3.846)
N 14173 7196 5090
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Results for Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test, MST00 Females
Treatment MST00, Female=1, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 25 28 30 30
Stratum 2 29 29 30 30
Stratum 3 22 24 25 25
Treatment MST00, Female=1, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 27 29 30 30
Stratum 2 28 30 30 30
Stratum 3 20 23 25 25
Figure 4: Graphical Check of Common Support for QST00
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Figure 5: Graphical Check of Common Support for MST00
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Variable Definitions for the 1980–1992 Sample
Label Definition
Personal Attributes
aXXYY Age at start of unemployment ≥XX and ≤ YY
age Age at start of unemployment
lnage ln(age) at start of unemployment
female Female
foreign No German citizenship
kids Has dependent children
married Married
BIL1 No vocational training degree
BIL2 Vocational training degree
BIL3 Abitur/No vocational training degree
BIL4 University/College degree
Last Employment
BER1 Apprentice
BER2 Blue Collar Worker
BER3 White Collar Worker
BER4 Worker at home with low hours or BER missing
BER5 Part–time working
pentg Daily earnings ≥ 15 Euro per day in 1995 Euro
entgcens Earnings censored at social security taxation threshold
entg Daily earnings if pentg=1 and entgcens=0, otherwise zero
logentg log of entg if pentg=1 and entgcens=0, otherwise zero
claim0 Remaining claim on unemployment benefit at beginning of
Stratum 1
claim181 Remaining claim on unemployment benefit at beginning of
Stratum 2
claim361 Remaining claim on unemployment benefit at beginning of
Stratum 3
lnclaimX (X = 0,
181, 361)
ln(claimX)
claimXg0 claimX=0
claimXg1 claimX>0 and claim0 ≤ 170
claimXg2 claimX>170 and claim0 ≤ 350
claimXg3 claimX>350
Last Employer
WZW1 Agriculture
WZW2 Basic materials
WZW3 Metal, vehicles, electronics
WZW4 Light industry
WZW5 Construction
WZW6 Production oriented services, trade, banking
WZW7 Consumer oriented services, organization and social services
frmsize1 Firm Size (employment) missing or ≤ 10
frmsize2 Firm Size (employment) > 10 and ≤ 200
<continued on next page>
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Label Definition
frmsize3 Firm Size (employment) > 200 and ≤ 500
frmsize4 Firm Size (employment) > 500
Employment and Program History
preexM Employed M (M=6, 12, 24) month before unemployment
starts
preex6cum Number of months employed in the last 6 months before un-
employment starts
preex12cum Number of months employed in the last 12 months before
unemployment starts
preex24cum Number of months employed in the last 24 months before
unemployment starts
preex60cum Number of months employed in the last 60 months before
unemployment starts
pretxY Participation in any ALMP program reported in our data in
year(s) Y (Y=1, 2) before unemployment starts
Regional Information
LAND6 Schleswig–Holstein/Hamburg
LAND7 Niedersachsen/Bremen
LAND8 Nordrhein–Westfalen
LAND9 Hessen
LAND10 Rheinland–Pfalz/Saarland
LAND11 Baden–Württemberg
LAND12 Bayern
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
tnull First unemployment month (January 1960=0)
y19YY Unemployment begins in year 19YY
Interaction of Variables
south Baden–Württemberg/Bayern
middle Hessen/Rheinland-Pfalz/Saarland
north Schleswig–Holstein/Hamburg/Niedersachsen/Bremen
BILXBERY Combination of education- and job-status-variables
yXXYY Unemployment begins between year 19XX and 19YY
All variables except those referring to benefit claims are defined at the time of entry into unem-
ployment and constant during the unemployment spell.
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Estimated Propensity Scores for the 1980–1992 Sample
Participation Probit for ST8092, Males
Treatment ST8092, Female=0
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 -0.201 (0.186) 0.123 (0.072)∗
BER3 0.229 (0.072)∗∗∗
BIL1BER2 0.114 (0.072) 0.365 (0.242)
BIL1BER3 0.636 (0.288)∗∗
BIL1a3034 0.341 (0.144)∗∗
BIL1a3544 -0.511 (0.252)∗∗
BIL2 0.429 (0.222)∗
BIL2BER3 -0.068 (0.192)
BIL2a3544 -0.416 (0.223)∗
BIL4 -0.188 (0.123)
LAND10 0.286 (0.086)∗∗∗
LAND8 0.169 (0.061)∗∗∗
LAND9 0.262 (0.084)∗∗∗
WZW1 0.235 (0.146)
WZW2 0.231 (0.098)∗∗
WZW3 0.301 (0.086)∗∗∗ 0.177 (0.073)∗∗
WZW6 0.184 (0.080)∗∗ 0.125 (0.060)∗∗
WZW7 0.121 (0.095)
a3044 0.161 (0.058)∗∗∗
a3544 0.520 (0.217)∗∗
a4553 -0.183 (0.076)∗∗
claim0 -0.002 (0.001)∗
claim0g0 -0.466 (0.353)
claim0g1 -0.479 (0.268)∗
claim0g2 -0.207 (0.130)
claim181 -0.001 (0.000)∗∗∗
entgcens -0.127 (0.179) -0.254 (0.234)
foreign -0.145 (0.085)∗ -0.130 (0.083) -0.284 (0.090)∗∗∗
frmsize1 -0.310 (0.088)∗∗∗ -0.025 (0.065)
frmsize2 -0.174 (0.078)∗∗
frmsize3 -0.049 (0.103) 0.122 (0.092)
kids -0.134 (0.077)∗
lnage -0.112 (0.126) 0.123 (0.133)
lnclaim361 -0.028 (0.014)∗∗
logentg -0.030 (0.023) 0.036 (0.030) -0.043 (0.040)
married -0.003 (0.069) -0.030 (0.062)
middle -0.012 (0.073) 0.147 (0.075)∗
north -0.151 (0.071)∗∗ -0.184 (0.079)∗∗
preex12cum 0.019 (0.019) -0.043 (0.022)∗
preex24cum -0.019 (0.011)∗ 0.001 (0.007) 0.018 (0.008)∗∗
preex60cum 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
preex6cum 0.036 (0.049)
south -0.147 (0.071)∗∗ -0.182 (0.079)∗∗
tnull -0.001 (0.001)
y1982 -0.222 (0.094)∗∗
y1983 -0.265 (0.099)∗∗∗
y1987 -0.254 (0.114)∗∗
y1990 0.150 (0.104)
y1991 0.385 (0.196)∗∗
y8182 0.175 (0.069)∗∗
y8687 0.361 (0.060)∗∗∗
_cons -2.159 (0.405)∗∗∗ -2.130 (0.507)∗∗∗ -2.676 (0.533)∗∗∗
N 60083 25711 15814
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Results for Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test, ST8092 Males
Treatment ST8092, Female=0, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 27 29 29 29
Stratum 2 22 23 24 24
Stratum 3 18 18 18 18
Treatment ST8092, Female=0, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 22 26 29 29
Stratum 2 21 24 24 24
Stratum 3 15 18 18 18
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Participation Probit for ST8092, Females
Treatment ST8092, Female=1
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
BER2 0.024 (0.088)
BER3 0.163 (0.083)∗
BIL1 0.477 (0.172)∗∗∗
BIL2 0.443 (0.180)∗∗
BIL2a3034 -0.148 (0.150)
BIL2a3544 0.171 (0.086)∗∗
LAND11 -0.181 (0.110)∗
LAND8 0.187 (0.060)∗∗∗
WZW3 0.094 (0.085) -0.141 (0.114)
WZW6 0.029 (0.077)
WZW7 -0.170 (0.087)∗∗
a3034 0.322 (0.123)∗∗∗
a3544 0.123 (0.069)∗ 0.124 (0.067)∗
claim0g1 0.578 (0.356)
claim0g2 0.861 (0.449)∗
claim0g3 0.825 (0.482)∗
claim181g0 0.933 (0.308)∗∗∗
claim181g1 0.772 (0.183)∗∗∗
claim181g2 0.573 (0.146)∗∗∗
claim_361 -0.219 (0.088)∗∗
entgcens 0.370 (0.298)
foreign -0.277 (0.121)∗∗
frmsize1 -0.119 (0.064)∗ -0.180 (0.094)∗
frmsize2 -0.208 (0.090)∗∗
frmsize4 -0.046 (0.100)
kids -0.036 (0.081) 0.005 (0.084) 0.025 (0.087)
lnage 0.036 (0.140) -0.155 (0.150)
lnclaim0 -0.133 (0.080)∗
lnclaim181 0.050 (0.044)
logentg 0.087 (0.036)∗∗ 0.088 (0.042)∗∗ 0.045 (0.047)
married -0.128 (0.058)∗∗ -0.125 (0.061)∗∗ -0.150 (0.059)∗∗
middle 0.133 (0.080)∗
north 0.022 (0.076) -0.108 (0.075)
preex12 -0.111 (0.084) 0.276 (0.135)∗∗
preex12cum -0.061 (0.033)∗
preex24 0.174 (0.078)∗∗
preex24cum 0.005 (0.011)
preex6 -0.145 (0.082)∗ 0.146 (0.189)
preex60cum 0.003 (0.003)
pretx2 0.317 (0.147)∗∗
south -0.265 (0.075)∗∗∗
tnull 0 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)∗∗ 0 (0.001)
y1984 -0.256 (0.130)∗∗
y1986 0.294 (0.084)∗∗∗
y1990 0.130 (0.117)
y1991 0.487 (0.178)∗∗∗
y8486 0.255 (0.069)∗∗∗
y8889 -0.245 (0.099)∗∗ 0.275 (0.102)∗∗∗
_cons -3.572 (0.576)∗∗∗ -3.530 (0.609)∗∗∗ -2.336 (0.389)∗∗∗
N 35927 23115 17148
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Results for Smith and Todd (2005) Balancing Test, ST8092 Females
Treatment ST8092, Female=1, Cubic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 22 22 22 22
Stratum 2 20 20 20 20
Stratum 3 21 22 22 22
Treatment ST8092, Female=1, Quartic of Pscore
P-values>.1 P-values>.05 P-values>.01 Regressors
Stratum 1 17 19 21 22
Stratum 2 18 18 20 20
Stratum 3 20 22 22 22
Figure 6: Graphical Check of Common Support for ST8092
0
10
20
30
40
50
 
10
20
30
40
50
 
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
 
    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
ST8092, Female=0, Stratum 2
0
10
20
30
40
50
 
10
20
30
40
50
 
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
 
    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
ST8092, Female=0, Stratum 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
 
10
20
30
40
50
 
0 .05 .1 .15
 
    Density of treated observations displayed on the upward ordinate.
ST8092, Female=1, Stratum 3
17
